We consider the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods, among agents, under cardinality constraints and additive valuations. In this setting, we are given a partition of the entire set of goods-i.e., the goods are categorized-and a limit is specified on the number of goods that can be allocated from each category to any agent. The objective here is to find a fair allocation in which the subset of goods assigned to any agent satisfies the given cardinality constraints. This problem naturally captures a number of resource-allocation applications, and is a generalization of the well-studied (unconstrained) fair division problem.
Introduction
A large body of recent work in algorithmic game theory, artificial intelligence, and computational social choice has been directed towards understanding the problem of allocating indivisible goods among agents in "fair" manner; see, e.g., [BCE + 16] and [End17] for excellent expositions. This recent focus on indivisible goods is motivated, in part, by applications (such as division of inheritance and partitioning computational resources in a cloud computing environment) which inherently entail allocation of goods/resources that cannot be fractionally allocated. In fact, algorithms developed for finding fair allocations of indivisible goods have been implemented in specific settings; for instance, Course Match [BCKO16] is employed for course allocation at the Wharton School in the University of Pennsylvania and the website Spliddit (www.spliddit.org) [GP14] provides free, online access to fair division algorithms.
Note that, though the theory of fair division is extensive, classical notions of fairness-such as envy freeness 1 -typically address allocation of divisible goods (i.e., goods which can be fractionally allocated) and are not representative in the indivisible setting. For instance, while an envy-free allocation of divisible goods is guaranteed to exist [Str80] , such an existence result does not hold for indivisible goods. 2 Motivated by these considerations, recent results have formulated and studied solution concepts to address fair division of indivisible goods [Bud11, PW14, BL14] . Arguably, the two most prominent notions of fairness in this context are (i) envy freeness up to one good (EF1) and (ii) the maximin share guarantee (MMS). These solution concepts were defined by Budish [Bud11] and they, respectively, provide a cogent analogue of envy-freeness and proportionality 3 in the context of indivisible goods:
(i) An allocation is said to be EF1 if every agent values her bundle at least as much as any other agent's bundle, up to the removal of the most valuable good from the other agent's bundle. EF1 allocations are guaranteed to exist; by contrast, for indivisible goods envy-free allocations might not exist. Another attractive feature of EF1 is that it is computationally tractable: even under combinatorial valuations, EF1 allocations can be found efficiently [LMMS04] . Furthermore, under additive valuations, this notion of fairness is compatible with Pareto efficiency [CKM + 16].
(ii) An allocation is said to satisfy MMS if each agent receives a bundle of value at least as much as her maximin share. These shares provide an agent-specific fairness threshold, and are defined as the maximum value that an agent can guarantee for herself if she were to partition the set of goods into n bundles and then, from those bundles, receive the minimum valued one; here, n is the total number of agents. That is, maximin share can be interpreted via an application of the standard cut-and-choose protocol over indivisible goods: if agent i is (hypothetically) asked to partition the set of goods into n bundles and the remaining (n − 1) agents were to select their bundles before i, then a risk-averse agent would find a partition which maximizes the least valued bundle. Overall, this value that the agent i can guarantee for herself is called the maximin share of i. Even though MMS allocations are not guaranteed to exist [PW14, KPW16] , this notion admits efficient approximation guarantees. Specifically, under additive valuations, there exist polynomial-time algorithms for finding allocations wherein each agent receives a bundle of value at least 2/3 times her maximin share [PW14, AMNS15, BK17] . 4 Note that these results establish an absolute guarantee, i.e., they show that an approximately maximin fair allocation always exists.
The existence and computational results developed for EF1 and MMS provide a sound understanding of fair division of indivisible goods. However, it is relevant to note that the vast majority 1 An allocation is said to be envy-free if each agent values her bundle at least as much as she values any other agent's bundle [Fol67, Var74] .
2 If we have a single indivisible good and two agents, then in any allocation, the losing agent is bound to be envious. 3 An allocation is said to be proportionally fair among n agents, if every agent gets a bundle of value at least 1/n times her value for the entire set of goods. of work in this thread of research is solely focussed on the unconstrained version of the problem. 5 To address this limitation, and motivated by the fact that in many real-world settings the allocations are required to satisfy certain criteria, we study a relevant, constrained version of the fair division problem.
In particular, we consider a setting wherein the indivisible goods are categorized (i.e., we are given a partition of the set of goods) and a limit is specified on the number of goods that can be allocated from each category to any agent. Here, the objective is to find a fair allocation in which the subset of goods assigned to any agent satisfies the given cardinality constraints. We shall see that this corresponds to a fair allocation problem under a partition matroid constraint.
The following stylized example-adapted from [GMT14] -demonstrates the applicability of such constraints: A museum decides to open new branches, and thereby needs to transfer some of the exhibits from the main museum to the newly opened ones. The exhibits are categorized into, say, statues, paintings, and pottery. In addition, there is an upper limit on the number of exhibits that every newly opened branch can accommodate from each category. The question now is to find a feasible division of the exhibits which is fair to the curators of each of the new branches.
Our Contributions:
We show that the existence and algorithmic guarantees established for EF1 and MMS allocations in the unconstrained setting can, in fact, be achieved under cardinality constraints as well. Specifically, we establish the following results under additive valuations and cardinality (partition matroid) constraints:
1. EF1 allocations are guaranteed to exist. In particular, we develop a combinatorial algorithm which, for a given fair division instance with additive valuations and cardinality constraints, finds an EF1 allocation in polynomial time (Theorem 1).
2. In this constrained setting, a constant-factor approximate MMS allocation always exists and can be computed in polynomial time (Theorem 2). Note that, in this setting, the value of the maximin share of each of the n agents is obtained by considering only feasible allocations (see Equation (1) in Section 2). That is, here, the maximin share of an agent is defined to be maximum value that she can guarantee for herself if she were to partition the set of goods into n bundles, each of which must satisfy the cardinality constraints, and from them receive the minimum valued one.
straints. In Section 5 we provide a (constrained) fair division instance which does not admit an EFX or an EFL allocation.
Related Work
The fairness notions of EF1 and MMS were defined by Budish [Bud11] (see also [Mou90] ), and these solution concepts have been extensively studied since then. [KPW16] provided intricate counterexamples to refute the universal existence of MMS allocations, even under additive valuations. This lead to a study of approximate maximin share allocations, α-MMS, where each agent receives a bundle whose value to her is at least α ∈ (0, 1) times her maximin share. Procaccia and Wang [PW14] developed an efficient algorithm to obtain a 2/3-MMS allocation when the number of agents is constant. Later, Amanatidis et al. [AMNS15] established that a 2/3-MMS allocation can be computed in polynomial (even in the number of players) time.
More recently, constant-factor approximation guarantees for MMS in settings wherein the valuations are not necessarily additive have been established in [BK17] Ferraioli et al. [FGM14] consider fair division problems where each agent must receive exactly k goods, for a given integer k, and provide an algorithm to efficiently compute a 1/k-approximate MMS allocation. A different kind of matroid constraint is considered in [GM17] and [GMT14] . In particular, the problem formulation in [GM17] and [GMT14] requires that the union of all the allocated goods is an independent set of a given matroid. This setup is incomparable to the one considered in this paper. Specifically, while we ensure that in the computed fair allocation each agent's bundle satisfies the partition matroid constraint and all the goods are allocated, these requirements are not imposed in [GM17] and [GMT14] . 
Notation and Preliminaries
For ease of notation, we will use v i (g), instead of v i ({g}), to denote the valuation of agent i for a good g.
Write Π t (S) to denote the set of all t-partitions of a subset of goods
, where A i is the subset of goods (bundle) allocated to agent i. In this work we focus on finding fair allocations which satisfy given cardinality constraints. Specifically, we are given a partition of the set of goods consisting of ℓ different "categories" {C 1 , C 2 , . . . , C ℓ }, and associated with each category h ∈ {1, 2, . . . , ℓ} we have a (cardinality) threshold k h . In this setup, an allocation A = (A 1 , A 2 , . . . , A n ) is said to be feasible iff, for every bundle A i and category h, the cardinality constraint holds:
Throughout, we will use F to denote the set of feasible allocations,
To ensure that F is nonempty, we require that the threshold
We will use
, F to denote an instance of the fair division problem subject to cardinality constraints. Overall, our goal is to find fair allocations contained in F. 8 In this work, we provide existential and algorithmic results for the following fairness notions:
• Envy-free up to one good (EF1): In a fair division instance
• Maximin Share Guarantee (MMS):
, F , the (constrained) maximin share of agent i is defined as
Since MMS allocations are not guaranteed to exist, the objective is to find feasible allocations (A 1 , . . . , A n ) ∈ F wherein each agent gets a bundle of value at least α ∈ (0, 1] times CMMS i ; with factor α being as large as possible. We call such allocations α-MMS.
Main Results
The key results established in this paper are:
with additive valuations and cardinality constraints (F = ∅), there exists a polynomial time algorithm for finding a feasible EF1 allocation.
This theorem is established in Section 4 and it implies that as long as the set of feasible allocations F is nonempty it admits an EF1 (i.e., a fair) allocation.
Theorem 2. Given any fair division instance
, F with cardinality constraints (F = ∅) and additive valuations, a 1/3-MMS allocation can be computed in polynomial time.
Analogous to the EF1 case, this theorem provides an absolute, existence guarantee for approximate maximin fair allocations under cardinality constraints. A proof of this result appears in Section 6.
We also establish that when the valuations are identical, then EF1 allocations exist and are efficiently computable even under matroid constraints; see Theorem 3 and Theorem 4 in Section 7.
EF1 Allocations Under Cardinality Constraints: Proof of Theorem 1
In the unconstrained setting, there exist efficient algorithms for finding EF1 allocations; see, e.g., the cycle-elimination algorithm of Lipton et al. [LMMS04] and the round-robin method by Caragiannis et al. [CKM + 16]. However, the allocations found by these algorithms are not guaranteed to satisfy the given cardinality constraints. We bypass this issue by developing a polynomial-time algorithm, ALG 1, for finding an allocation A which is not only EF1, but also feasible, i.e., A ∈ F. 
Using Lemma 1, update A h = (A h 1 , . . . , A h n ) to obtain an acyclic envy graph G(A h ).
7:
Update σ to be a topological ordering of G(A h ).
8: end for 9: Return A ℓ .
ALG 1 is based on an interesting modification of the round-robin algorithm: initially, ALG 1 selects an arbitrary order (permutation) over the agents σ := (σ(1), . . . , σ(n)). It then picks an unallocated category h and executes the Greedy-Round-Robin algorithm (ALG 2) with the n agents, |C h | goods (from category C h ), and the selected order σ.
ALG 2 follows the ordering σ in a round-robin fashion (i.e., it selects agents, one after the other, from σ(1) to σ(n)), and iteratively assigns to the selected agent an unallocated good from C h that she desires the most. Finally, it returns an allocation B h ∈ Π n (C h ).
After allocating all the goods of a category h, Step 6 of ALG 1 creates an envy graph 9 G(A h ). It was established in [LMMS04] that one can always efficiently update a given partial allocation such that the resulting envy graph is acyclic: t ← t + 1.
4:
for i = 1 to n do 5:
Update
Update M ← M \ {g t σ(i) }. end for 12: end while 13: Return B = (B 1 , . . . , B n ).
Finally, σ is updated to be a topological ordering of the acyclic directed graph G(A h ). This new ordering is then used for the next category of goods.
The feasibility of the computed allocation, A ℓ , directly follows from the fact that (for each h ∈ [ℓ]) ALG 2 distributes the |C h | goods evenly among n agents. In particular, the round-robin nature of ALG 2 ensures that, B h i , the set of goods allocated to agent i from category h satisfies: 10
In Lemma 2 we show that, for each h ∈ [ℓ], the partial allocation obtained after the allocating the first h categories, A h , is EF1. Since Algorithm 1 allocates all the m goods we get that the final allocation, A ℓ , is in fact EF1 as well.
This, along with the observation that ALG 1 runs in polynomial time completes the proof of Theorem 1. 9 An envy graph, for an allocation A, is a directed graph that captures the envy between agents in A. Specifically, the nodes in the envy graph represent the agents and it contains a directed edge from i to j iff i envies j, i.e., iff vi(Ai) < vi(Aj).
10 Recall that the underlying feasible set of allocations F is nonempty iff the integer limit
Next, we establish a proposition which will be used in the proof of Lemma 2. 
Proof. Write T := ⌈ |C| n ⌉ to denote the total number of rounds of ALG 2. In each round, for i < j, agent σ(i) gets to choose her most desired good among the unallocated goods before agent σ(j). Hence, if g t σ(i) and g t σ(j) denote the good assigned to agent σ(i) and σ(j), respectively, in the tth
Since the valuations are additive, the stated property holds:
It is known that the round-robin algorithm results in an EF1 allocation [CKM + 16], we repeat the argument for completeness: If index i is less than j, then agent σ(i) does not envy agent σ(j). On the other hand, even if i > j the good allocated to agent σ(i) in the tth round is of value (under v σ(i) ) no less than the good allocated to agent σ(j) in the (t + 1)th round:
) for all t ∈ {1, . . . , T − 1}. Summing we get,
. Thus, the allocation B is EF1.
Lemma 2. ALG 1 returns an EF1 allocation.
Proof. We will show inductively that, for each h ∈ [ℓ], the partial allocation obtained after allocating the first h categories, A h , is EF1. Hence, the returned allocation, A ℓ is EF1 as well.
Here, the base case (h = 1) follows from Proposition 1; since A 1 = B 1 and the proposition ensures that B 1 is EF1.
By the induction hypothesis we have that A h is EF1 and, by construction, the corresponding envy graph G(A h ) is acyclic. Next, we will show that this continues to hold for the next category h + 1. Note that the ordering of agents for (executing ALG 2 over) the category C h+1 is obtained by topologically sorting G(A h ). Let π be that topological ordering and write π −1 (a) as the index of agent a according to the ordering π. Now, if agent a envies b in A h , then there is a directed edge from a to b in G(A h ) and, hence, π −1 (a) < π −1 (b). In this case, Proposition 1 ensures that a does not envy b in B h+1 , i.e., we have
Summing the last two inequalities and noting that
we get that A h+1 is EF1 with respect to agent a and b.
The complementary case wherein a does not envy b in A h is analogous, since B h+1 is guaranteed to be EF1 in itself. Overall, this establishes the stated claim, that the final allocation A ℓ is EF1.
Lemma 2 along with the feasibility argument mentioned above (and the direct observation that ALG 1 runs in polynomial time) proves Theorem 1, which we restate below. 
Theorem 1. Given any fair division instance
, for all goods g in A j which are positively valued by agent i) we have
• Envy-free up to one less-preferred good (EFL) [BBKN18] : An allocation A = (A 1 , A 2 , . . . , A n ) is said to be EFL iff for every pair of agents i, j ∈ [n] at least one of the following conditions hold:
-A j contains at most one good which is positively valued by i, i.e.,
Note that, by definition, an EFX allocation is necessarily EFL and, similarly, an EFL allocation is always EF1.
The universal existence of EFL allocations in unconstrained fair division instances (with additive valuations) was established in [BBKN18] . By contrast, the following example shows that, under cardinality constrains, EFL allocations do not always exist. This also implies the non-existence of EFX under cardinality constraints.
Example 1. Consider an instance with 2 agents and 4 goods. Here, the bundle of each agent is constrained to contain at most 2 goods. That is, we have a (uniform matroid) single category C 1 , which contains all the goods, and the threshold
The valuations of both the agents are identical and as follows: v(g 1 ) = 50 and v(g 2 ) = v(g 3 ) = v(g 4 ) = 1. In this example, no feasible allocation will ensure EFL.
In this example any feasible allocation will allocate exactly two goods to each agent. Therefore, one of the agents, say a 1 , will receive a bundle of value 51 (containing the high-valued good g 1 and a low-valued good), while the other agent, a 2 , will receive a bundle of value 2 (containing two low-valued goods). Since agent a 2 envies a 1 , EFL can be ensured only if there exists a good of value at most 2 in a 1 's bundle which, when removed, eliminates a 2 's envy. However, such a good does not exist in a 1 's bundle and, hence, no feasible allocation is EFL.
MMS Under Cardinality Constraints: Proof of Theorem 2
To obtain an α-approximate maximin share allocation (α-MMS) under cardinality constraints we define a nonnegative, monotone, submodular function F i (·), for each agent i ∈ [n], which satisfies
Hence, a fair division problem under additive valuations and cardinality constraints reduces to an unconstrained fair division problem under monotone, submodular valuations (F i ) i . Recall that a function F i (·) is said to be monotone and submodular iff for all subsets
Here, Top k i (T ) denotes the set of the k most valued (by agent i) goods contained in T . The following lemma asserts that F i s are submodular.
Lemma 3. For each agent i ∈ [n] the function F i (·) (defined above) is monotone, nonnegative, and submodular.
Proof. Since, for each agent i ∈ [n], the valuation v i (·) is nonnegative, the function F i (·) is nonnegative as well. Furthermore, for any agent i ∈ [n] and category h ∈ [ℓ], the function f h i is monotone; it either increases or remains constant after a good g ∈ [m] is included in any bundle S. Hence,
Next, we will show that for any agent i ∈ [n] the function F i is submodular, i.e., it satisfies the following inequality, for any two subsets S ⊆ T ⊂ [m] and good g / ∈ T .
Write h to denote the category of the good g, i.e., g ∈ C h \ T . Since including g in the subsets only effects the value of f h i , we have
Therefore, if the cardinality of T ∩ C h is strictly less that k h , then the inequality (2) is in fact tight. Otherwise, if |T ∩ C h | ≥ k h , then we have the following two cases
Here, we have f h i (T ∪ {g}) = f h i (T ). Furthermore, the monotonicity of function f h i (·) ensures that f h i (S ∪{g})−f h i (S) ≥ 0. Therefore, inequality (2) holds.
and, hence, inequality (2) holds.
That is, v i (g ′ ) ≤ v i (g ′′ ) and, again, inequality (2) is satisfied.
Recall that the set of feasible allocations F is nonempty if and only if the cardinality thresholds
. Assuming nonempty set of feasible allocations, we now establish that the maximin value over all feasible allocations using valuations v i (·) is equivalent to the maximin value over all possible [n]-partitions of [m] using the function F i (·).
Lemma 4. If for all the categories h ∈ [ℓ], the cardinality threshold satisfies
k h ≥ |C h | n (i.e.,
if the set of feasible allocations F is nonempty), then the following equality holds for each agent
Proof. We fix an agent i ∈ [n] and first show that the left-hand side of the stated equality is upper bounded by the right-hand side. Write (A * 1 , . . . , A * n ) ∈ arg max (P 1 ,...,Pn)∈F min j∈[n] v i (P j ). Since |A * j ∩ C h | ≤ k h for all h and j, we have
establishes the upper bound. We complete the proof by showing that an inequality holds in the other direction as well. Write
n , an averaging argument implies that there exists another index a ∈ [n] for which |B * a ∩ C h | < k h . Now, consider the lowest valued
. Hence, we can iteratively perform such swaps till all the cardinality constraints are satisfied. That is, we can obtain an allocation, say B ′ = (B ′ 1 , . . . , B ′ n ) ∈ F, which is feasible and satisfies
. The feasibility of B ′ ensures that the following equality holds for all j:
Hence, the left-hand side of the equality stated in the lemma is at least as much as the right-hand side.
Under submodular valuations a 1/3-MMS allocation can be computed efficiently in the unconstrained setting [GHS + 17]. Therefore, for an unconstrained fair division instance over the m goods and with submodular valuations of the n agents as (F i ) i , we can, in polynomial time, find an allocation A = (A 1 , . . . , A n ) ∈ Π n ([m]) which is 1/3-MMS. Employing a swap argument-similar to the one used in the proof of Lemma 4-we can efficiently convert A into a feasible allocation B ∈ F which satisfies
. That is, for the unconstrained instance, B is a 1/3-MMS allocation as well. In addition, the feasibility of B implies that F i (B i ) = v i (B i ), for all i. Overall, via Lemma 4 (i.e., the fact that the maximin shares of each agent i in the constructed unconstrained instance is equal to the underlying CMMS i value), we get that B is a feasible, 1/3-MMS allocation for the constrained instance. This completes the proof of Theorem 2, which is restated below.
Theorem 2. Given any fair division instance
Identical Valuations and Matroid Constraint
This section shows that if the additive valuations of the agents are identical (i.e., v i = v j for all i, j ∈ [n]), then an EF1 allocation is guaranteed to exist even under a matroid constraint.
Matroids have been studied extensively in mathematics and computer science; see, e.g. [Oxl92] . These structures provide an encompassing framework for representing combinatorial constraints; in particular, the cardinality constraints considered in the previous sections correspond to a particular matroid, called the partition matroid. Proof. We establish the result by showing that an allocation which maximizes the Nash Social Welfare over the set M is necessarily EF1. For an allocation A = (A 1 , . . . , A n ), the Nash Social Welfare (NSW) is defined as the geometric mean of the agents' valuations, NSW(A) :
Let v(·) denote identical, additive valuations of the agents. We assume v(g) > 0 for all g ∈ [m] and consider an optimal allocation A ∈ arg max B∈M NSW(B), which satisfies NSW(A) > 0. 12 We will prove that A is EF1. Since A ∈ M, the stated claim follows.
Say, for contradiction, that A is not an EF1 allocation, then we will show that there exists another allocation A ′ ∈ M along with agents i and j, such that A ′ h = A h , for all other agents h ∈ [n] \ {i, j}, and min{v(
The last inequality and the fact that
. Therefore, we get NSW(A ′ ) > NSW(A), which contradicts the optimality of A.
By definition, if A is not EF1, then there exists a pair of agents i, j such that
Note that if there exists a good g in A j such that A i ∪ {g} is independent (i.e., A i ∪ {g} ∈ I), then swapping g from A j to A i gives us the desired allocation A ′ (with a strictly higher NSW than A). Hence, we analyze the case in which no such good exists. In particular, we have A i ∪ {g} / ∈ I for all g ∈ A j . This condition implies that |A i | ≥ |A j |; otherwise, the Independent Set Exchange property of matroids would ensure the existence of a good g ∈ A j such that A i ∪ {g} ∈ I.
Write t := |A j |. The independence of A i and A j along with the inequality |A i | ≥ |A j | = t imply that there exist t component-wise distinct pairs of goods {(g i z , g
. This fact is established in [Goe09] for the case wherein |A i | = |A j | = t. Lemma 5 (proved below) complements this result and guarantees the existence of the relevant t component-wise distinct pairs of goods,
Next, we will complete the proof of the theorem using the pairs {(g i z , g 
}, which implies that the NSW of A ′ is higher than that of A. This, by contradiction, completes the proof.
Lemma 5. Let ([m], I) be a matroid with independent subsets I, J ∈ I which satisfy I ∩ J = ∅ and |I| ≥ |J|. Then, there exists a one-to-one map µ : J → I such that swapping any j ∈ J with µ(j) ∈ I leads to independent subsets, i.e., for any element j ∈ J, both (J \ {j}) ∪ {µ(j)} and (I \ {µ(j)}) ∪ {j} belong to I.
Proof. Using the independent set exchange property of matroids, subset J can be extended to an independent subset, say J ′ , such that |J ′ | = |I| and J = J ′ \ I.
It is shown in [Goe09] that for any two independent subsets of the same cardinality, I and J ′ , there exists a bijection µ : J ′ \ I → I \ J ′ which satisfies the required swap property, i.e., for any j ∈ J ′ \ I, both (J ′ \ {j}) ∪ {µ(j)} and (I \ {µ(j)}) ∪ {j} are independent. Since J is a subset of J ′ , we get that (J \ {j}) ∪ {µ(j)} ∈ I and, hence, the lemma holds.
For completeness, below we provide a proof of the result from [Goe09] . This proof uses the strong basis exchange lemma (see, e.g., [Oxl92] ), which states that, given any two bases B 1 and B 2 of a matroid, for all elements b 1 ∈ B 1 \ B 2 there exists an element b 2 ∈ B 2 \ B 1 such that both (B 1 \ {b 1 }) ∪ {b 2 }) and (B 2 \ {b 2 }) ∪ {b 1 } are independent.
Consider the truncated matroid T := ([m], {S ∈ I | |S| ≤ |I|}). Subsets I and J ′ are bases for the matroid T . Hence, applying the strong basis exchange lemma (SBE), we get that for any element j ∈ J ′ \ I there exists an element i ∈ I \ J ′ such that (I \ {i}) ∪ {j} and (J ′ \ {j}) ∪ {i} are independent (and, hence, bases for T ).
Set µ(j) = i and reapply SBE on bases J ′ and I ′ := (I \ {µ(j)}) ∪ {j} with a new elementĵ ∈ J. This provides us with a swap elementî ∈ I ′ \ J ′ such that (J ′ \ {ĵ}) ∪ {î} is basis. Since µ(j) / ∈ I ′ , we getî = µ(j). Furthermore, the fact thatî is contained in I ′ \ J ′ impliesî = j. Therefore, we can extend the bijection µ by setting µ(ĵ) =î. Overall, repeatedly applying SBE leads to the desired one-to-one map µ, and completes the proof.
Next we provide an efficient algorithm for finding an EF1 allocation under identical, additive valuations and matroid constraints. In particular, Theorem 4 provides a constructive proof of existence for EF1 allocations in the current setup. Proof. The work of Gabow and Westermann [GW92] provides an efficient algorithm to compute a partition A = (A 1 , . . . , A n ) of the m goods such that A i ∈ I, for all i ∈ [n]. Algorithm 3 starts with such a partition and then iteratively reallocates goods between the bundles till an EF1 allocation is obtained. The algorithm maintains the invariant that at any point of time the partition in hand is in M. That is, throughout the execution of the algorithm the bundles allocated to the agents remain independent.
Let A = (A 1 , A 2 , . . . , A n ) be a partition considered by the algorithm during its execution and write ℓ to denote the index of the least valued bundle in A, i.e., ℓ := arg min i∈[n] v(A i ). Also, write V(A) to denote the set of indices of the bundles that violate EF1 with respect to the the least valued bundle A ℓ
Note that allocation A is EF1 iff V(A) = ∅. We will use A h to denote the highest valued bundle which violates the EF1 condition with respect to A ℓ , i.e., h := arg max i∈V(A) v(A i ). By definition of the the violating set, we have
Algorithm 3 aims to reallocate good(s) between A h and A ℓ such that the resulting bundles remain independent. We will prove (via case analysis) that the intended reallocation is always possible and it results in either (i) a decrease in the cardinality of A h by one, or (ii) a drop in the value of A h by a multiplicative factor of 1 − 1 m 2 .
Case (i): |A ℓ | < |A h |. Since A ℓ , A h ∈ I, by the independence set exchange property, there exists a good g ∈ A h such that A ℓ ∪ {g} ∈ I. Algorithm 3 transfers such a good g from A h to A ℓ , and in this case the cardinality of A h drops by one. {ℓ is the index of the least valued bundle in A}.
{V is the set of indices i such that the bundle A i violates EF1 with respect to A ℓ } 4: while V = ∅ do 5:
{h is the index of the highest valued bundle in V} 6:
Set g = arg max
{By the independent set exchange property of matroids, such a good g is guaranteed to exist} 8:
Update A h ← A h \ {g} and A ℓ ← A ℓ ∪ {g}.
9:
else 10:
Let µ be the map obtained by applying Lemma 5 to independent sets A ℓ and A h {Here, |A ℓ | ≥ |A h | and we have µ : Update A h ← (A h \ {g}) ∪ {µ(g)} and A ℓ ← (A ℓ \ {µ(g)}) ∪ {g}. Update ℓ ← arg min
15: end while 16: Return A = (A 1 , . . . , A n ).
Case (ii):
. Without loss of generality, assume that the goods in A h are indexed such that
. We show that among these pairs there exists one, (g x , µ(g x )), which satisfies v(
Since t ≤ m, the selected pair (g x , µ(g x )) satisfies the required property v(
Lemma 5 ensures that the bundles (A h \ {g x }) ∪ {µ(g x )} and (A ℓ \ {µ(g x )}) ∪ {g x } are independent. Hence, whenever |A h | ≤ |A ℓ |, Algorithm 3 can swap goods between A h and A ℓ such that the bundles remain independent and the value of the bundle A h drops by a multiplicative factor of at least 1 − 1 m 2 .
Consider an iteration wherein the algorithm updates partition A = (A 1 , A 2 , . . . , A n ) ∈ M to obtain partition A ′ = (A ′ 1 , A 2 , . . . , A ′ n ) ∈ M. This update decreases the valuation of the bundle A h and increases the valuation of This containment ensures that if an index i is dropped from the violating set V(A) then it is never included back in the set in any later iteration. Next we will show that an index can be the highest valued bundle, i.e., h, in V(A) for at most a polynomial number of iterations. This, overall, implies that the algorithm finds an EF1 allocation in polynomial time.
Note that every time an index i is selected as the highest valued bundle in V(A) either the cardinality of A i decreases by one or its valuation drops by a multiplicative factor of 1 − 1 m 2 . Furthermore, while A i continues to violate the EF1 condition with respect to the least valued bundle its value cannot increase in an update (only the least valued bundle experiences an increase in valuation). Hence, after i is selected as the highest valued bundle in the violating set, say, m 2 k + m times, v(A i ) is at most 1 − 1 m 2 m 2 k ≤ 1 e k times its initial value. Therefore, for a polynomially large k, we get that any index i cannot be the highest valued bundle in the violating set more than m 2 k + m times. Overall, this establishes that the algorithm terminates after a polynomial number of iterations and the stated claim follows.
Conclusion and Future Work
This paper extends the active line of work on fair division of indivisible goods and shows that fairness guarantees are not lost by imposing cardinality constraints. In particular, we show that EF1 allocations are guaranteed to exist even under cardinality constraints. Note that, though the round-robin method [CKM + 16] and cycle-elimination algorithm [LMMS04] efficiently find EF1 allocations in the unconstrained setting, these algorithms can lead to an allocation which does not satisfy the cardinality constraints. In this paper we bypass this issue by combining the round-robin method with envy graphs in an interesting manner.
The universality of EF1 is further strengthened by our result which shows that if the agents' valuations are identical (and additive), then fair (EF1) allocations exist even under matroid constraints. Establishing such a guarantee-along with computational results-for heterogeneous valuations (additive and beyond) remains an interesting direction of future work. 13 We also show that, even under cardinality constraints, approximate maximin fair allocations always exist and can be computed efficiently. This result is obtained by reducing the constrained version of the problem (with additive valuations) to an unconstrained one (with submodular valuations). This reduction might be useful for addressing other constrained, fair division problems.
Going forward it would be quite relevant to study fair division, both unconstrained and constrained, among strategic agents.
